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This paper proposes a simple model that formalizes a variant of Ohanian’s (2001)
conjecture explaining the productivity declines observed in the Great Depression. If
a large payment shock like an asset-price collapse renders many ﬁrms insolvent,
other economic agents become exposed to a higher risk of not being paid (payment
uncertainty). The payment uncertainty causes endogenous disruptions of the division
of labor among ﬁrms, thereby lowering macroeconomic productivity.
The prediction of the model is that productivity correlates negatively with bankrupt-
cies and positively with the cost share of intermediate inputs, which is consistent with
the data from depression episodes. The model implies that the so-called failure of
macroeconomic policy in the United States during the early 1930s, when a rash of
bankruptcies occurred, could actually have been welfare enhancing, since the quick
exit of insolvent agents can resolve payment uncertainty quickly.
∗I am grateful to Masaru Inaba for his excellent research assistance.
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1 Introduction
The recently growing literature on great depressions,1 in which the general equilibrium
growth model is normally used as the paradigm of the analyses, shows that productivity
declines were the primary contributor to the depressions in many cases.
It is shown that the declines in total factor productivity (TFP) explain almost all
declines in output and investment during the 1929—33 period in the United States (Cole
and Ohanian [1999]; Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2002]). Hayashi and Prescott (2002)
show that the protracted recession in Japan during the 1990s is consistent with a standard
growth model, given the persistent slowdown of TFP growth. Bergoeing, Kehoe, Kehoe,
and Soto (2002) ﬁnd that the diﬀerence between the spectacular recovery of Chile and the
long stagnation of Mexico subsequent to the external debt crises that hit both countries
in the early 1980s is explained by the diﬀerence of recoveries of the productivity in both
countries: The detrended TFP began to grow again quickly in Chile, while it continued
to decline for a long period in Mexico. In Germany, Fisher and Hornstein (2002) ﬁnd
falling productivity was one of the most important contributors to the severe decline in
the 1928—1932 period. Thus the literature has shown that general equilibrium growth
theory can account for several depression episodes very well, taking productivity changes
as given. The next question is what were the sources of the productivity declines in those
depressions.
1The January 2002 issue of The Review of Economic Dynamics, edited by Timothy J. Kehoe and
Edward C. Prescott, examines nine depression episodes from the perspective of growth theory. Kehoe
and Prescott (2002) deﬁnes a great depression as a time period during which detrended output per
working-age population falls at least 20% and the fall at least 15% must occur within the ﬁrst decade of
the depression. According to this deﬁnition, the current Japanese depression is not a great depression,
but they argue that it will become a great one soon if the Japanese economy continues to stagnate.
2This paper presents a simple theoretical model that possibly explains the productivity
changes in those depression episodes. The model may be regarded as a formalized variant
of a conjecture made by Ohanian (2001). Some empirical evidence is provided using data
from the Great Depression in the United States and the 1990s in Japan.
The model focuses on the payment process in the economy, in which a ﬁrm buys
an intermediate input, transforms it into the next-stage intermediate good, and sells
it to another ﬁrm. The intermediate goods are passed down from ﬁrm to ﬁrm in the
market and are ﬁnally transformed into consumer goods. At a certain time, an economy
operating under this production technology is hit by an exogenous macroeconomic shock
that disturbs the payment process and renders many ﬁrms insolvent. The shock can be
interpreted as the emergence and subsequent collapse of asset-price bubbles or an abrupt
change in exchange rates.
On the one hand, I postulate an assumption that seems fairly orthodox in economics
(Smith [1776]; Becker and Murphy [1992]) but does not generally receive much attention
in recent business cycle literature. This is that productivity is enhanced by the division
of labor. In other words, even when the total amount of inputs does not change, output
increases if the number of specialized ﬁrms that are involved in production increases. On
the other, I assume that the increase of insolvent ﬁr m sc o n t i n u i n gt oo p e r a t eo nt h ev e r g e
of bankruptcy makes a persistent “payment uncertainty,” that there remains a positive
probability that an insolvent ﬁrm will go bankrupt and will fail to pay its suppliers. An
increase in the number of ﬁrms involved in the production process results in an increase
in productivity through the division of labor, which enhances the proﬁto faﬁrm, while
it also causes a rise in payment uncertainty, which depresses the expected proﬁto ft h e
ﬁrm. Thus payment uncertainty causes an endogenous decline in productivity through
ﬁrms’ decision making over the division of labor.
It is assumed that government policies determine the bankruptcy rate, at which insol-
vent ﬁrms go bankrupt and are restructured to be healthy ﬁrms. Taking the bankruptcy
rate as an exogenously determined policy variable, it is shown that the path of the model
productivity with a high bankruptcy rate replicates that in the Great Depression, and
3that the productivity with a low bankruptcy rate replicates that of the 1990s in Japan.
Since fast recovery of productivity enhances social welfare unless there are some labor
or investment frictions, a government policy that allows quick bankruptcies of insolvent
ﬁrms may be welfare enhancing. A numerical example shows that the presumed failure of
US macroeconomic policy in the early 1930s, which led to a rash of bankruptcies, could
have been welfare enhancing, and that the extraordinary ﬁscal and monetary expansion
during the 1990s in Japan, which kept many insolvent ﬁrms aﬂoat for a long period,
could have been welfare reducing.
The decline in productivity in this paper is ultimately driven by disruption of the di-
vision of labor among ﬁrms. This mechanism is similar to Blanchard and Kremer (1997)
and Kobayashi (2004a). The novelty of the present paper is that the endogenous disrup-
tion of the division of labor occurs through perfect competition in a frictionless market,
in which ﬁrms trade intermediate goods as atomic sellers or buyers. The other papers
assume that ﬁrms form a team for production explicitly, and the results in these papers
therefore crucially depend on the speciﬁc assumptions on relationships among ﬁrms in
a team. The results in the present paper do not depend on any strategic relationships
among ﬁr m s ,a n dt h u st h e yh o l di nam o r eg e n e r a le n v i r o n m e n t .
Payment uncertainty associated with trade credits plays a central role in the disrup-
tion of the division of labor in this model. Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) and Calvo (2000)
address the problem of trade credits, and they propose theoretical models in which a
disruption of a chain of trade credits ampliﬁes a recession. The basic structure of their
models is that a liquidity shortage is ampliﬁed through disruption of the chain of credits,
and it seems to explain investment friction in a temporary recession, although not pro-
ductivity declines. In my model, payment uncertainty faces new creditors and suppliers,
not incumbent creditors that roll over bad loans to insolvent ﬁrms. Lamont (1995) ar-
gues that investments and outputs may ineﬃciently shrink if new creditors have a risk
of not being paid in full and incumbent creditors take most of the outputs. Although
the Lamont model shares the thinking of my model in some respects, it does not show a
decrease in productivity, while it does show that a decrease in investments can be caused
4by a demand shortage in an economy of monopolistic competition.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy describes productivity changes in
depressions. Section 3 develops the basic structure of the model. Section 4 introduces
payment uncertainty subsequent to a macroeconomic shock and describes productivity
declines under the payment uncertainty. Section 5 provides some empirical evidence, and
Section 6 presents a summary and conclusions.
2 Productivity and payment uncertainty in depressions
Figures 1 and 2 show output, investment, labor, and TFP in the Great Depression in
the United States and in the 1990s in Japan. The variables are detrended by the growth
rate of TFP.
Figure 1. Macroeconomic variables in the Great Depression
Figure 2. Macroeconomic variables in the 1990s in Japan
The recent research on the Great Depression shows that a main cause of the severe
output decline during the 1929—33 period was a productivity fall, and that ﬁnancial
constraints on investments might be insigniﬁcant (Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan [2002]).
Ohanian (2001) assesses ﬁve common explanations for TFP declines: changes in capacity
utilization, labor quality, and production composition; labor hoarding; and increasing
returns to scale. He points out that only 5 percentage points of the 18 percent TFP
decline during 1929—33 is explained by them, and the other 13 points are left unexplained.
He conjectures that declines in organization capital may be the explanation for the rest:
The breakdowns in supplier-customer relationships could have required ﬁrms to search
for new suppliers and customers or to adopt new technologies; the search activities
could have lowered eﬃciency by reducing managers’ labor inputs dedicated to organizing
and planning production; and new technologies could have been used only ineﬃciently,
since ﬁrms were inexperienced with these technologies. Thus, the primary cause of
ineﬃciencies in Ohanian’s conjecture is an increase in bankruptcies possibly associated
with the asset-price collapse in 1929. Disruption of the division of labor due to payment
5uncertainty can be another potential mechanism for declines in organization capital. The
rash of commercial and bank failures in the early 1930s indicates that economic agents
then might have felt a very high risk of not being paid by their customers. The rise of
payment uncertainty could have lead to endogenous shrinkage of the division of labor
among economic agents through the mechanism described in the following sections.
To check the relevancy of the model, it is necessary to measure payment uncertainty
during the Great Depression. Although there may be other economic variables that
represent payment uncertainty, I chose the liabilities of failed businesses and suspended
banks as the most straightforward proxy. Figure 3 shows the sum of liabilities of failed
businesses and suspended bank deposits. This ﬁgure shows a surge of liabilities of failed
businesses and banks in the 1930—33 period. There is a caveat for this ﬁgure. If bank
liabilities are excluded, the surge in the early 1930s disappears. The level of liabilities of
commercial failures in the Great Depression was similar to that in the 1921—22 depres-
sion. Thus the surge in Figure 3 mainly reﬂects the surge of bank failures in the Great
Depression. Yet I believe that the sum of commercial and bank liabilities is a good proxy
of payment uncertainty, since the banking sector was the core of the payment process
and suspended bank liabilities were not protected then by the government or deposit
insurance.
Figure 3. Sum of commercial failures and bank suspensions (United States)
As for the 1990s in Japan, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) show that the annual growth
rate of TFP in the 1991—2000 period was 0.3% while that in the 1983—91 period was 3.7%,
and stress that this sharp and persistent decline of TFP growth was the main cause of
Japan’s lost decade.2 They also assert that ﬁnancial frictions may not have been an
important factor in Japan’s recession, since they ﬁnd that Japanese corporations were
2The TFP slowdown during the 1990s in Japan is conﬁrmed by several authors. Jorgenson and
Motohashi (2003) report that Japan’s TFP growth was 1.01% in the 1975—90 period and 0.74% in the
1990—95 period. Miyagawa (2003) reports that TFP growth was 1.63% in the 1981—90 period and 0.84%
in the 1991—99 period. The diﬀerences seem mainly due to diﬀerences in the deﬁnitions of capital inputs
and the TFP factor.
6able to ﬁnd ﬁnancing for investments in the 1990s.3 T h ee x p l a n a t i o ni nt h ep r e s e n tp a p e r
is consistent with their view that productivity slowed down even though investments were
not constrained. Figure 4 shows the liabilities of failed ﬁrms in the Japanese economy.4
After the asset-price bubbles burst, the level of liabilities rose to about 10 trillion yen
on the average in the 1990s from about 3 trillion yen in the 1980s. This increase in
bankruptcies indicates that economic agents began to feel more risk of not being paid by
their customers in the 1990s.
Figure 4. Total liabilities and number of failed businesses (Japan)
Bergoeing et al. (2002) show that diﬀerence of productivity growth is the most
important factor behind the sharp contrast between economic recovery in Chile and
long stagnation in Mexico during the 1980s and the 1990s. They demonstrate that
productivity growth was faster in Chile than in Mexico, and they hypothesize that Chile’s
earlier policy reforms in banking and bankruptcy procedures generated this diﬀerence.
They report that the number of business bankruptcies in Chile surged in 1982—3, when
TFP plummeted, and then quickly went back to normal in 1984, when TFP started
to grow again. The path of the number of bankruptcy indicates the quick resolution
of payment uncertainty in Chile, which may explain the recovery of TFP through the
mechanism described in this paper.
3Hosono and Watanabe (2002) also conﬁrm empirically that the liquidity constraint for Japanese ﬁrms
did not become severer in the 1990s. Andolfatto (2003) also argues that monetary and ﬁnancial problems
in Japan’s lost decade may be irrelevant to the output decline.
4The liabilities of failed banks are not included in Figure 4, since the Japanese government guaranteed
all bank liabilities during the 1990s. I assume that liabilities of failed banks do not aﬀect payment
uncertainty, since the creditors are protected. (The rise in bankruptcies in the 1990s would be simply
emphasized by the inclusion of bank failures in Figure 4, since there were very few bank failures until
1995.) Japan has had deposit insurance since 1971, and while the protection had a formal upper limit of
10 million yen per depositor, the public came to believe that the government would never let any bank
fail and would guarantee all bank liabilities. In 1995, amid a deepening ﬁnancial crisis, the government
in fact made just such a guarantee of liabilities explicit.
73 Basic model
In this section, I describe the basic structure of the model and the competitive equilibrium
in the case where the economy is not subject to payment uncertainty. In Section 4, I
introduce payment uncertainty caused by an exogenous macroeconomic disturbance in
the payment process.
3.1 Environment
The economy is comprised of consumers, ﬁrms, and a government. In this economy, time
is discrete and continues from zero to inﬁnity: t =0 ,1,2,···,∞.T h e r e a r e i n ﬁnitely




where β (0 < β < 1) is a discount factor, u(c) is an increasing and concave function,
and ct is the consumption in period t. The measure of the consumers is normalized to
one. There are also inﬁnitely many ﬁrms with measure one, who are risk-neutral and
maximize proﬁts. Only ﬁrms, not consumers, have access to the production technology
described below.
3.2 Production technology
Consumers are endowed with a nondepletable asset (land), the total supply of which
is K, at the beginning of period 0. They are also endowed with L units of labor at
the beginning of each period t (t =0 ,1,2,···). I assume that there are n diﬀerent
goods indexed by i ∈ {1,2,···,n},w h e r en is a large integer, and that consumers can
consume good-1 only, while good-i (i =2 ,3,···,n)i sa ni n t e r m e d i a t eg o o dt h a tc a nb e
used for production of good-(i − 1) but cannot be consumed by consumers. If good-i
(i =2 ,3,···,n) is produced during period t and is not used as an input for producing
good-(i − 1) by the following technology (2), then good-i perishes at the end of period t
without being consumed or stored.
8In each period t, ﬁrms produce goods using one of the following two production




where φ(i) is the productivity for good-i production, θ (0 < θ < 1) is a parameter, yi is
the output of good-i, li+1 is the labor input, ki+1 is the capital input of land. I assume
that φ0(i) > 0a n dφ00(i) < 0. Good-i (i ∈ {1,2,···,n − 1}) can also be produced from







where A is a productivity parameter, and yi+1 is the intermediate input of good-(i+1 ).
As shown in Lemma 1 below, in the equilibrium, there exists n ≥ 1 such that good-
n is produced by technology (1) and good-i (1 ≤ i<n ) is produced by technology
(2). From the assumption that φ(n)i si n c r e a s i n gi nn and good-(i +1 )i su s e do n l yf o r
production of good-i, it is interpreted that n is the degree of the division of labor, and
that the division of labor enhances productivity φ(n).
I assume a technological constraint that if a ﬁrm is to produce good-i by technol-
ogy (2), it must buy the intermediate input (good-(i + 1)) from other ﬁrms; it cannot
conduct production of the next-stage good using its own output. This constraint can be
interpreted as saying that a ﬁrm specializes in the production of only one kind of good
during period t and cannot use its output for the next-stage production during the same
period. This constraint makes the payment process relevant to aggregate productivity.
3.3 Firm’s problem
Since this paper focuses on a decentralized market economy, it is assumed that all ﬁrms
a r ep r i c e - t a k e r s .A tt h eb e g i n n i n go fp e r i o dt,aﬁrm chooses the good to produce (good-
i), production technology ([1] or [2]), and the amounts of inputs, in order to maximize its
proﬁt, given period-t prices:{R,P1,P 2,···,P n},w h e r ePi is the price of good-i in period t
and R is the rent of capital (i.e., land) in period t. Labor input is taken as the numeraire,
9and thus the wage rate is set at one. To simplify notation, I omit time subscript t when
there is no possibility of confusion. Given prices, a ﬁrm that produces good-i from land





i+1 − Rki+1 − li+1. (3)
The ﬁrm buys labor li+1 from consumers and rents land ki+1 from (other) consumers









i+1 − Pi+1yi+1 − Rki+1 − li+1. (4)
Since the ﬁrm cannot use its own output in the next-stage production, it buys good-
(i +1 )f r o mo t h e rﬁrms and rents land ki+1 and buys labor li+1 from consumers. In
any case, a ﬁrm must buy inputs from other ﬁrms and consumers, and sell the output
to other ﬁrms and other consumers. Since there are continuously and indeﬁnitely many
consumers and ﬁrms of measure one in this economy, I can assume the following for
trading in the market:
Assumption 1 In each period t, ﬁrms buy inputs from and sell outputs to economic
agents whom they randomly encounter in the market. The random matching is eﬃcient
in the sense that all markets clear every period without any friction.
This assumption is crucial to generate payment uncertainty under an environment where
many ﬁrms operate on the verge of bankruptcy (see Section 4). In order to simplify the
analysis, I assume the following for the ﬁrm’s choice of technology:
Assumption 2 If πφ(i)=π(i),aﬁrm that wants to produce good-i will choose technol-
ogy (2).
The following lemma holds in the equilibrium where ﬁrms are price-takers and earn zero
proﬁts.




10where Max[Ω] is the maximum element of the set of integers Ω.I nt h ee q u i l i b r i u mw h e r e
prices are given as {R,P1,P 2,···,P n} and price-taking ﬁrms earn zero proﬁts, good-n is
produced from labor and land using technology (1), good-i (1 ≤ i<n )i sp r o d u c e df r o m
good-(i +1 )using technology (2), and good-i (i>n ) is not produced.
( P r o o f )I ti ss h o w na sf o l l o w st h a tπφ(n) ≥ πφ(i), for all i 6= n. Suppose (k∗
i+1,l ∗















The competition among ﬁrms implies that πφ(n)=0≥ πφ(i)f o ra l li 6= n in the equilibrium.
This fact and Assumption 2 imply that only good-n is produced from labor and land using
technology (1). The other goods must be produced from intermediate goods using technology
(2), if they are produced at all.
It is easily shown that good-i (n<i≤ n) is not produced by induction: Since good-n is not
produced from labor and land, it is not produced at all. For i>n , if good-i is produced, it must
be produced from good-(i +1 ) ;B u ts i n c eg o o d - n is not produced, backward induction implies
that good-i is not produced for all i>n .
It is also easily shown that good-i for 1 ≤ i<nis produced: Suppose that good-i is
not produced in the equilibrium. Since good-(i + 1) cannot be consumed, it perishes at the
end of period t, implying that good-(i + 1) is not produced if good-i is not produced. The
contraposition of this statement implies that if good-(i+1) is produced in the equilibrium, good-
i is also produced. Since good-n is produced, it is shown by induction that good-i (1 ≤ i<n )i s
also produced.
Therefore, since it is shown that good-i (1 ≤ i<n ) is produced in the equilibrium and it is
not produced using technology (1), it must be produced from good-(i + 1) using technology (2).
(End of proof)
3.4 Consumer’s problem








P1,tct + Qtkt+1 ≤ Rtkt + Qtkt + L,
11and k0 = K, given prices {Rt,P 1,t,Q t}∞
t=0,w h e r ect is the consumption in period t, kt is
the land holding at the beginning of period t, P1,t is the price of good-1, Qt is the price
of land, and Rt is the rent of capital during period t.
3.5 Payment process
During period t, ﬁrms buy and sell intermediate goods, and consumers sell labor and rent
land to ﬁrms and buy consumer good (good-1) from ﬁrms. I assume that all transactions
during a period are done by trade credits, which are settled at the end of the period.
In Section 4, I describe bankruptcies and defaults on trade credits after an exogenous
payment shock hits the economy.
3.6 Equilibrium
The competitive equilibrium is deﬁned as follows:
Deﬁnition 1 The competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {P1,t,P 2,t,···,P n,t,Q t,R t}∞
t=0
and allocations {nt;y1,t,y 2,t,···,y nt,t;kt,k 2,t,k 3,t,···,k nt+1,t;l2,t,l 3,t ···,l nt+1,t}∞
t=0 that
satisﬁes the following conditions (a) — (h):
(a) Given prices, nt is the solution to (5); (b) Given prices, ct = y1,t and kt+1 solve the
consumer’s problem (6); (c) Given prices, lnt+1,t and knt+1,t solve the ﬁrm’s problem (3)
for i = nt,a n dπφ(nt)=0 ; (d) Given prices, {yi+1,t,k i+1,t,l i+1,t} (1 ≤ i<n t)s o l v e
the ﬁrm’s problem (4), and π(i)=0 ;( e )kt =
Pnt
i=1 ki+1,t = K;( f )
Pnt
i=1 li+1,t = L;( g )
ynt,t = φ(nt)kθ
nt+1,tl1−θ






In what follows in this subsection, I omit the time subscript for simplicity, since the
competitive equilibrium is a steady state equilibrium as shown below.
The equilibrium prices and allocations are characterized as follows. The ﬁrst-order























































1−α.T h u s , s i n c e
Pn
i=1 ki+1 = K and
Pn
i=1 li+1 = L,i ti se a s i l ys h o w nt h a t ,g i v e nn,
ki
K = li













= αα(1 − α)1−αAPi−1.
For simplicity of exposition, I assume the following for the parameter values:
(1 − α)1−αααA =1 . (13)










,a sl o n ga sg o o d - i is produced. Thus the problem (5) that deter-
mines n is written as




lnγ + α−i+1 lnP1 +l nφ(i).








13Given n, Pn, kn+1,a n dln+1, the equilibrium rent R is determined by (11). The equi-
librium values of n and P1 are determined by (15) and (10). From these equations, it is
shown that n is uniquely determined by
φ0(n)
φ(n)
= −{ln(1 − θ)+l nφ(n)}lnα. (16)
In this equation and in what follows, I treat n as a real number, in order to simplify the
exposition. The restriction that n is an integer can be easily incorporated with minor
adjustments in the analysis.




P1,t+1{Rt + Qt+1}. In the equilibrium, Qt is given by Qt =
β
1−βR.T h u s , t h e
competitive equilibrium is completely characterized.
The output of consumer goods in each period in the competitive equilibrium is
y1 = A(n)KθL1−θ,
where
lnA(n) ≡ αn−1 lnφ(n) − (1 − αn−1)ln(1− θ).
The number n can be seen as the degree of the division of labor in this economy, and A(n)
the aggregate productivity. It is easily shown that A(n) is maximized by the equilibrium
value of n that satisﬁes (16). Figure 5 plots A(n) as a function of n,g i v e nt h a tφ(n)=na,
α =0 .9, a =0 .1, and n = 1000. The equilibrium value of n is 44.
Figure 5: Aggregate productivity
It is also easily conﬁrmed that the allocation of the competitive equilibrium is the
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i+1 , for 1 ≤ i<n ,
k2 + k3 + ···+ kn+1 = K,
l2 + l3 + ···+ ln+1 = L.
(18)
14It is easily shown that the solution to this problem (ki, li,a n dn) satisfy (12) and (16).
I make a digression before ending this section. The result in this section that the divi-
sion of labor is endogenously limited in a perfectly competitive economy is interesting in
itself. This is because Adam Smith’s famous theorem, “the division of labor is limited by
the extent of the market,” has been long regarded as holding not in perfect competition
but only in a setting with imperfect competition or market frictions (see, for example,
Stigler [1951], Baumgardner [1988], Kim [1989], and Kobayashi [1998]). Since φ(n)i s
increasing in n, one may expect that perfect competition in a frictionless economy will
realize the maximum value of n (i.e., n), which is not the case in the competitive equilib-
rium of this model. Thus it can be said that this model suggests one way of reconciliation
between competitive price theory and Smith’s theorem. As the degree of the division
of labor (n) increases, the amount of factor inputs to production of one intermediate
goods decrease as a result of the frictionless market competition. And thus, aggregate
productivity A(n) becomes quite diﬀerent from φ(n), and it decreases if n becomes too
large.
4 Productivity declines under payment uncertainty
This section describes the productivity changes subsequent to a large disruption in the
payment process, such as the emergence and collapse of asset-price bubbles.
4.1 Payment shock
In this paper, it is assumed that there are no real shocks on productivity or preferences.
I focus on an exogenous payment shock that renders some ﬁrms insolvent. Prior to the
shock, the model assumes that while there are trade credits between ﬁrms and consumers,
there are no nonperforming loans from consumers to ﬁrms. After the shock, as a result of
disruption of the payment process, nonperforming loans owed by ﬁrms to consumers are
generated instantaneously, and they are far larger than ordinary trade credits. I assume
that these nonperforming loans emerge at a portion of ﬁrms with measure z (0 <z<1)
15at the end of period 0, after payoﬀs concerning the activities in period 0 are over. Since
the ﬁrms have no assets after the payoﬀs, they are clearly insolvent.
Assumption 3 An insolvent ﬁrm owes a nonperforming loan to only one consumer.
The nonperforming loan to the ﬁrm is observable only to the ﬁrm itself and the creditor.
An insolvent ﬁrm has the same production technology as other ﬁrms; therefore, other
consumers or other ﬁrms cannot distinguish it from a healthy ﬁrm.
Note that an insolvent ﬁrm is not ineﬃcient per se in terms of production technology; the
only diﬀerence is that the creditor (consumer) has too large a claim on the prospective
assets of the insolvent ﬁrm. The reason why nonperforming loans are generated is not
speciﬁed in this paper. I simply assume that some exogenous shock (e.g., the emergence
and bursting of asset-price bubbles) made some ﬁrms insolvent. I denote the amount
( m e a s u r e di nt e r m so fl a b o ru n i t s )o ft h en o n p e r f o r m i n gl o a nt oe a c hi n s o l v e n tﬁrm at the
beginning of period 1 by N.Ia s s u m et h a tN is very large (see Section 4.3). An insolvent
ﬁr mh a sn oa s s e t sc o r r e s p o n d i n gt ot h el i a b i l i t yN. Consumers have nonperforming loans
Nz to z ﬁrms as their assets in addition to landholdings at the beginning of period 1.
4.2 Government policy on insolvent ﬁrms
Since the consumers’ nonperforming loans Nz are not backed by ﬁrms’ assets, the insol-
vent ﬁrms would go bankrupt immediately. But distortion-producing government policies
or ineﬃcient economic institutions do not allow all insolvent ﬁrms to go bankrupt im-
mediately. I assume that there is a parameter x (0 <x<1), which is determined by
government policy or institutional factors, that represents the rate of bankruptcy. De-
note the measure of the remaining insolvent ﬁrms at the beginning of period t by zt.I
assume the following.
Assumption 4 During period t, the remaining insolvent ﬁrms of measure zt conduct
production activities and provide and receive trade credits, just like other healthy ﬁrms.
Among zt insolvent ﬁrms, xzt of them go bankrupt at the end of period t, after all trade
credits of period t are made but before any of them are settled.
16Therefore, zt evolves by
zt+1 =( 1− x)zt,
where z1 = z. I assume that the government cannot set x at zero, but there is a lower
bound x (> 0) such that x ≤ x<1.
We can interpret the paths of the bankruptcies in the United States (Figure 3) and
Chile as corresponding to the case of a high x, while that in Japan (Figure 4) may
correspond to the case of a low x.
In order to simplify the calculation, I assume that at the beginning of period t +
1, bankrupt ﬁrms of measure xzt are replaced by newly established ﬁrms of the same
number, and thus the total measure of the ﬁrms remains constant as one.
4.3 Bankruptcies
When an insolvent ﬁrm goes bankrupt, the incumbent creditor (consumer) of the non-
performing loan can seize all the assets of the ﬁrm, and all payments of trade credits from
the ﬁrm to other creditors are cancelled. To make clear the meaning of this assumption,
let us consider the case where an insolvent ﬁrm continues to operate and conducts pro-
duction activities during period t a n dg o e sb a n k r u p ta tt h ee n do fp e r i o dt.W eh a v et h e
following from Assumption 1 and the fact that the insolvency of a ﬁrm is not observable.
At the settlement time, the ﬁrm has as its assets the trade credits to its customers,
while it has as its liabilities the nonperforming loan N from a consumer and the account
payable to its suppliers of the intermediate good and to other consumers for the rent
of land and the wage. If this ﬁrm goes bankrupt at the end of period t, the creditor
that provided N seizes all the assets and cancels payment to the debtor’s other creditors.
Caveats for this assumption on bankruptcy follow. One may consider that the assump-
tion that the incumbent creditor takes everything is too strong as a model of bankruptcy.
But in practice, it usually happens that suppliers fail to collect on their claims. In this
paper, I made the above extreme assumption in order to focus on the uncertainty that
suppliers feel when they sell goods to (possibly insolvent) ﬁrms. Another caveat is that I
implicitly assume that N is always larger than the amount of assets that the ﬁrm holds
17when it goes bankrupt. This assumption is just for simplicity of calculation. Otherwise
the incumbent creditor seizes only N if the assets of the ﬁrm exceed it, and the other
creditors of the trade credits get paid partially, making the analysis more complicated
without making substantial changes in the results.
4.4 Firm’s problem
If insolvent ﬁrms of measure xzt go bankrupt at the end of period t,t h e r ee m e r g e sa
risk that a payment will not be settled. Since Assumption 3 implies that a seller cannot
tell whether the buyer is an insolvent ﬁrm or not, sellers become constantly exposed
to a positive probability of not being paid. Therefore, prices of intermediate goods are
distorted by this payment uncertainty. Consider a (healthy) ﬁrm that produces and sells
good-i (2 ≤ i ≤ nt − 1) in period t, where only good-nt is produced from labor and
capital. A buyer will go bankrupt and fail to pay with probability xzt.I n o r d e r t o
simplify the analysis, I assume the following:
Assumption 5 A ﬁrm that produces good-i divides its output into inﬁnitesimally small
fractions and sells them to inﬁnitely many ﬁrms. The law of large numbers implies that
the ﬁrm obtains the revenue (1 − xzt)Pi,tyi,t with probability one, where yi,t is the total
output.








i+1 − Pi+1,tyi+1 − Rtki+1 − li+1.
(19)
And since consumers do not go bankrupt, the proﬁto ft h eﬁrm that sells good-1 to
consumers is π(1;0).





n+1 − Rtkn+1 − ln+1. (20)
By the similar arguments as the proof of Lemma 1, it is easily shown that n =a r gm a x i qtPiφ(i),
where qt =1− xzt. The resource constraints (
Pn
i=1 ki+1 = K and
Pn
i=1 li+1 = L)a n d




















where qt =( 1− xzt). Using (13), the FOCs also imply
Pi+1,t =( γqt)α−1
Pα−1
i,t , for 2 ≤ i<n t,
and P2,t = γα−1
Pα−1
1,t . Therefore, in the equilibrium where the proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrms







1,t , for 2 ≤ i<n t.
Since n =a r gm a x i qtPiφ(i), the above equation implies
































Since n must be no less than one, its equilibrium value is determined as follows: nt =
max{n0
t,1},w h e r en0






ln(1 − θ) −
α
1 − α
ln(1 − xzt)+l nφ(n)
¾
lnα. (24)
Since ln(1 − xzt) < 0a n dφ0(n)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nn, it is easily shown that
nt <n ∗,
5Here I treat n as a real number to simplify the exposition, as in the previous section. The restriction
that n is an integer can be incorporated with some trivial adjustments.
19where n∗ is the solution to (16). Therefore, when economic agents face payment uncer-
tainty, the degree of the division of labor declines. Given nt, the FOC with respect to







The conditions (21) and resource constraints (18) imply that the ﬁnal output of good-1
(i.e., consumption ct) in the equilibrium is







1 − α +( 1− qt)qnt−1
t αnt +l nA(nt).
Since A(nt)KθL1−θ is the value of output that is maximized by the social planner’s
problem (17) with n ﬁxed at nt, the equilibrium productivity Φ(qt)u n d e rt h ep a y m e n t
uncertainty must satisfy Φ(qt) ≤ A(nt).
4.5 Consumer’s problem







P1,tct + Qtkt+1 ≤ (1 − xzt)Rtkt +( 1− xzt)L + Qtkt + Tt,
given prices (P1,t, Qt, Rt), the lump-sum gain (Tt), and the initial value k0 = K.T h e
lump-sum gain Tt, the amount of which is speciﬁed below, is the gains that the consumers
(i.e., the incumbent creditors of nonperforming loans to insolvent ﬁrms) obtain by asset-
seizures in bankruptcies of xzt insolvent ﬁrms. Moreover, the consumers have as their
assets the nonperforming loans Nzt, which are nontradable and decrease over time.6
6We can posit that nonperforming loans are tradable and let them enter into the consumer’s budget
constraint by assuming that for some political reasons the government guarantees growth of the nonper-
forming loans at the market rate of interest. I did not choose this modiﬁcation, since it would complicate
the analysis without changing the results essentially. See Kobayashi (2004b) for the model with this
setting.
20The gap Nzt+1 − Nzt = −Nxzt is recognized as a lump-sum loss of bankruptcies of
xzt insolvent ﬁrms incurred by the consumers (i.e., the creditors of the nonperforming
loans).
I assume for simplicity of calculation that consumers obtain the rent (1−xzt)Rtkt and
the wage (1−xzt)L deterministically by, say, forming fair insurance among themselves. As
equation (25) shows, the equilibrium allocations are kt = K and ct = Φ(1−xzt)KθL1−θ.




{(1 − xzt+1)Rt+1 + Qt+1}.









Firms’ proﬁt maximization implies that P1,ty1,t = P2,ty2,t+Rtk2,t+l2,t,( 1−xzt)Pi,tyi,t =
Pi+1,tyi+1,t + Rtki+1,t + li+1,t for 2 ≤ i<n ,a n d( 1− xzt)Pn,tyn,t = Rtkn+1,t + ln+1,t.




xztPi,tyi,t + xztRtkt + xztL,
where kt = k2,t + k3,t + ···+ kn+1,t.U s i n gP2,ty2,t = P1,ty1,t − Rtk2,t − l2,t, xztPi,tyi,t =
Pi,tyi,t−Pi+1,tyi+1,t−Rtki+1,t−li+1,t for 2 ≤ i<n ,a n dxztPn,tyn,t = Pn,tyn,t−Rtkn+1,t−
ln+1,t,w eo b t a i n
Tt = P1,ty1,t − (1 − xzt)Rtkt − (1 − xzt)L.
Therefore, the equilibrium allocations kt = K and ct = y1,t(= Φ(1 − xzt)KθL1−θ)o b v i -
ously satisfy the consumer’s budget constraint, given the above Tt.
4.6 Share of intermediate inputs
In order to conduct an empirical test later, it is useful to clarify the prediction of the







21In the equilibrium, P1y1 = P2y2+Rk2+l2, qPiyi = Pi+1yi+1+Rki+1+li+1 for 2 ≤ i<n ,






2 − q − qi−2







(1 − q)qi−2(Rki + li).




1+( 1− q)α − qn−1αn





1 − α +( 1− q)qn−1αn(RK+L).
Thus, the share of intermediate inputs is written as
sM =
α − qn−1αn
1+( 1− q)α − qn−1αn. (27)
Since n =m a x {n0,1},w h e r en0 is the solution to (24), is a function of q =1− xzt,i ti s
diﬃcult to show whether sM is increasing or decreasing in q. It is numerically shown,
however, that sM is an increasing function of q,g i v e nt h a tφ(n)=na, a =0 .1, and
α =0 .9. See Figure 6. The plausibility of the value of α is argued in the next subsection.
Figure 6. Cost share of intermediate inputs
This ﬁgure implies that in the equilibrium with payment uncertainty, aggregate produc-
tivity is positively correlated with the share of intermediate inputs. I will check this
prediction in Section 5 using data from the 1990s in Japan.
4.7 Productivity and welfare
This model implies that when a macroeconomic shock disturbs the payment process and
renders many ﬁrms insolvent unexpectedly, the government policy on the insolvent ﬁrms
aﬀects the path of TFP growth subsequent to the shock. In Figure 7, the paths of TFP,
i.e., Φ(1 −xzt), corresponding to x =0 .9a n dx =0 .3 are plotted, given that φ(n)=na,
z =0 .2, a =0 .1, and α =0 .9.
The value of α is taken from a calibration by Basu (1995). As shown in equation
(27), α approximates the share of intermediate inputs in total cost in this model economy.
The data from United States and Japan show that the share of intermediate inputs is
22approximately 0.5, implying that α =0 .9 is not reasonable. Basu concludes, however,
that the counterpart of α in his model must be in the range of 0.8−0.9 from an estimation
of markups. He justiﬁes his calibration as follows: It is natural to assume that there are
large ﬁxed costs of production; it is easy to amend the production function to allow for
ﬁxed costs, without changing the results of the analysis; and with ﬁxed costs, α is no
longer the share of intermediate inputs in total cost, but the share in total variable cost.
Assuming that the ﬁxed inputs consist of labor and capital, we can have a very high
value of α, while the share of intermediate inputs in total cost stays at roughly 0.5. In
this paper I follow Basu’s argument, and reinterpret sM in (27), which is approximated
by α for a large n, as the share of intermediate inputs in total variable cost.
Figure 7. Productivity and welfare
I nt h ec a s eo fx =0 .9, where the government allows quick bankruptcies of insolvent
ﬁrms, productivity plummets at ﬁrst and recovers very quickly. It can be said that this
pattern replicates the path of productivity in the United States and Chile. In the case of
x =0 .3, where the government postpones reforms and keeps many insolvent ﬁrms aﬂoat,
productivity stays relatively high at ﬁrst but stagnates at a low level for a longer period.
I tc a nb es a i dt h a tt h i sp a t t e r nr e p l i c a t e st h ep a t ho fp r o d u c t i v i t yi nt h e1 9 9 0 si nJ a p a n .
This ﬁgure also shows social welfare
P∞
t=0 βtu(ct) as a function of government policy x.
The functional form and parameters are given by u(c)=l nc, β =0 .99, L =1 ,a n dK =1 .
The consumption is given by ct = Φ(qt)i nt h i sc a s e .T h eﬁgure implies that immediate
bankruptcies of insolvent ﬁrms bring about the highest welfare for consumers in the case
where the government policy x is constrained by 0.3 ≤ x<1. This result means that
the “failure” of macroeconomic policy in the early 1930s in the United States, which
brought about a rash of bankruptcies, could actually have been welfare enhancing, as
could the policy reforms in Chile, and that the “successful” macroeconomic stabilization
by extraordinary ﬁscal and monetary expansion in the 1990s in Japan, which kept many
insolvent ﬁrms aﬂoat, could have been welfare reducing. Since TFP in the United States
recovered quickly starting in 1934, Cole and Ohanian (2002, 2004) and Chari, Kehoe,
and McGrattan (2002) argue that the reduced welfare triggered by the Great Depression
23persisted during 1934—39 not because of low-level productivity but because of labor
friction, possibly due to New Deal policies. Their view may support the implication of
this paper that the rash of bankruptcies and bank failures in 1930—33 could have been
welfare enhancing in the sense that it could have brought about a rapid recovery of
aggregate productivity through a quick resolution of payment uncertainty.
There is an important caveat for the above policy implication. The model in this
paper, like other neoclassical models, does not take account of the disutility caused by
unemployment, which must have been very signiﬁcant during great depressions. If we
t a k ea c c o u n to ft h i sd i s u t i l i t y ,w em a yn o tb ea b l et os a yt h a tt h eq u i c ke x i to fi n s o l -
vent ﬁrms always enhances social welfare. Since, historically, the primary objective of
macroeconomic policy has been reduction of unemployment, the above policy implication
may be quite odd for policy practitioners. This paper claims that only under a special
assumption that social welfare is not a function of unemployment, welfare becomes larger
as insolvent ﬁrms go bankrupt quicker.
There are two related policy implications. First, suppose that the government over-
looks the causal link between its policy x and payment uncertainty, and mistakenly
regards productivity {Φ(qt)}∞
t=1 to be an exogenous process independent of x.I n t h i s
case, if there is some political demand to lower x, a benevolent government, wanting sim-
ply to maximize social welfare, may set x at such a small value that it unintentionally
causes productivity to stagnate and social welfare to decline.7
Second, if the government is not constrained by 0.3 ≤ x and can set x at any non-
negative value, it can maximize productivity and social welfare by setting the value of
x close to zero. In other words, if the government gives large subsidies to insolvent
7This implication exhibits a contrast to that of Bergoeing et al. (2002). They provide the explanation
for the growth diﬀerence that before policy reform, the government favors one sector by allocating larger
resources to it. This explanation means that the government intentionally lowers productivity in order
to give favors to a speciﬁc sector, and that the government is not maximizing social welfare as a whole.
In the present paper, the forbearance policy (i.e., a large x) does not involve direct costs, since insolvent
ﬁrms are not ineﬃcient per se (see Assumption 3). Thus a welfare-maximizing government may lower x,
if it overlooks the eﬀect of payment uncertainty on productivity.
24ﬁrms, thereby enabling them to continue operating for a suﬃciently long period, social
welfare will become larger than in the case without such subsidies. This means that suf-
ﬁciently aggressive ﬁscal (and monetary) expansion may eﬀectively mitigate declines in
productivity and welfare even in a great depression. An aggressive subsidy policy might,
however, be politically infeasible, since taxpayers might not consent to bailing insolvent
ﬁrms out using the government expenditures. Moreover, if people can conﬁdently ex-
pect the government to give huge subsidies to failed ﬁrms, ﬁrm managers will encounter
grave moral hazards, and serious agency problems may result, leading to other types of
productivity declines.
5 Some empirical evidence
The model implies that in the equilibrium under payment uncertainty, nt and productiv-
ity decrease as xzt increases. Using the total liabilities of failed businesses as a proxy for
xzt, this relationship can be checked by estimating the correlation between productivity
and bankruptcies.
The estimation results for the Great Depression (1930—39) and the 1990s in Japan
are shown in Table 1.8 In the estimation, detrended TFP is regressed on the liabilities
of failed businesses. In the case of the United States, TFP is detrended by the growth
rate of 1.83%, which is the trend growth rate of TFP in the 1921—28 period, and in the
case of Japan, it is detrended by 1.22%, the trend growth in the 1975—87 period.9 The
total liabilities of failed businesses include bank failures for the United States but not for
Japan. The results imply that productivity is negatively correlated with bankruptcies in
8As for the Japanese macroeconomic data in this section, Fumio Hayashi kindly permitted me to use
the database for Hayashi and Prescott (2002).
9I assume that the 1921—28 period was representative of the balanced growth path, in which TFP
grows at the rate of technological progress, which can be regarded as a constant. I assumed so because the
distorting eﬀects of the World War I seem to have disappeared by 1921, and the distortion of asset-price
bubbles seem to have started growing in 1929. For Japan, I posit that the economy was on the balanced
growth path in the 1975—87 period, since the distortion caused by the oil crisis of 1973—74 seems to have
disappeared by 1975, and that by asset-price bubbles became signiﬁcant in 1988.
25both depression cases.
Table 1. Correlation between productivity and business failures
One can argue that these results may simply reﬂect seemingly apparent countercyclicality
of bankruptcies and procyclicality of TFP. But the negative correlation between these
variables is not apparent from standard growth theory, since bankruptcies may mostly
represent reductions of inputs rather than declines of TFP. To check whether these
results have relevancy to payment uncertainty, I also conducted the same estimation for
the 1921—28 period in the United States and for the 1975—87 period in Japan, using both
detrended and original TFPs.10 The results show that there was no signiﬁcant correlation
between bankruptcies and productivity in either case, implying that signiﬁcant payment
uncertainty could have emerged only after the asset-price collapses of 1929 in the United
States and of 1990—91 in Japan.
As shown in Section 4.6, the model also implies that the share of intermediate inputs
in total cost positively correlates with productivity in the equilibrium with payment
uncertainty.11 Because of the data availability on the cost share of intermediate inputs,
the estimation can be conducted only for the 1990s in Japan. The result is shown in
Table 2. Note that TFP is also detrended at the growth rate of 1.22%. The result is
consistent with the model, showing that the detrended TFP correlates positively with
the cost share of intermediate inputs.
Table 2. Productivity and cost share of intermediate inputs
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I presented a possible mechanism of productivity declines in depressions.
If a macroeconomic shock, such as a bursting of asset-price bubbles, renders many ﬁrms
10The independent variables for the regression of the original TFP are liabilities of failed businesses,
the trend, and a constant.
11Since according to the model, productivity correlates with the share of intermediate inputs in total
variable cost (sM), the share in total cost must correlate with the productivity, too.
26insolvent, other ﬁrms become exposed to payment uncertainty, i.e., a higher risk of
not being paid by their customers. The payment uncertainty distorts relative prices of
intermediate goods and causes an endogenous disruption of the division of labor among
ﬁrms, leading to shrinkage of chains of productions and lower aggregate productivity.
The model implies that the presumed failure of macroeconomic stabilization during
the Great Depression, which lead to a rash of bankruptcies, could have been welfare en-
hancing, since the quick exit of insolvent ﬁrms could have resolved payment uncertainty.
The model predicts that productivity negatively correlates with bankruptcies and
positively correlates with the cost share of intermediate inputs. The data from the Great
Depression and the 1990s in Japan are consistent with these predictions, giving (weak)
support for the model.
This paper may be regarded as a preliminary step in an inquiry into the causes of
productivity declines during great depressions. In the future, various models should
be proposed and examined empirically using more complete data sets for depression
episodes.
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1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 1937 1938 1939
Detrended TFP
Source: Kendric (1961),  Table A-IIb and Table A-XIX.
Note: Investment = New construction and equipment + Change in business inventries + Net foreign investment.
          TFP = 100*(Real gross product/Total factor input).
          All data are detrended by 1.83%, the average growth rate of TFP from 1921 to 1928.
          1929 = 100.
 
Growth accounting for the United States
TFP Capital Labor
1929 6.3% 3.8% 1.0% 1.5%
1930 -9.4% -4.5% 0.6% -5.5%
1931 -9.1% -2.1% 0.2% -7.1%
1932 -15.3% -5.9% -0.5% -8.9%
1933 -2.3% -1.7% -0.8% 0.2%
1934 10.7% 10.0% -0.8% 1.6%
1935 10.2% 6.3% -0.4% 4.3%
1936 14.5% 6.7% -0.1% 7.9%
1937 5.9% 2.7% 0.3% 2.9%
1938 -5.8% 0.0% 0.1% -6.0%




























1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Detrended TFP
Source: Hayashi and Prescott database, http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hayashi/Hayashi-Prescott1.htm.
Note: TFP = Real GNP / Total factor input, where total factor input equals labor input raised to the labor share
          times capital input raised to the capital share.
          All data are detrended by 1.22%, the average growth rate of TFP from 1975 to 1987.
          1990 = 100.
Growth accounting for Japan
TFP Capital Labor
1990 5.1% 2.1% 3.0% 0.0%
1991 3.8% 1.4% 2.3% 0.1%
1992 1.2% -0.2% 2.1% -0.7%
1993 0.3% 0.3% 1.7% -1.6%
1994 0.5% -0.4% 1.2% -0.2%
1995 1.4% 0.1% 1.0% 0.3%
1996 5.3% 3.5% 1.3% 0.6%
1997 1.7% 0.6% 1.1% 0.1%
1998 -2.4% -2.9% 1.6% -1.1%
1999 -0.2% 1.1% 0.5% -1.8%
























Sources: NBER Macrohistory, IX. Financial Status of Business, U.S. Liabilities of Business Failures, All Commercial,
              http://www.nber.org/databases/macrohistory/contents/chapter09.html (accession number m09033a).
              Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), "Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914--1941."
              George Thomas Kurian, "Datapedia of the United States, 1790--2000: America year by year," 1994.
Note: Liabilies = suspended deposit liablities + liablities of failed businesses.
         The number and liabilities of business failures in 1938 and 1939 are based on George Thomas Kurian (1994).
Figure 3. Sum of commercial failures and bank suspensions (United States)
number millions of dollars
                    Number (right axis)















number billions of yen
Source: Tokyo Shoko Research, Annual Business Failure [in Japanese], http://www.tsr-net.co.jp/topics/zenkoku/level_4/tousan_suii.html.
Note: Summary of major business failures with more than 10 million yen in liabilities.
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q Figure 7. Productivity and welfare 
 
Parameters: z0 = 0.2, a = 0.1,α = 0.9,β = 0.99,θ = 0.3, K = 1, L = 1 
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log(detrended TFP)= c(1)+c(2) log(L)
Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.  
Constant, c(1) 4.68 0.08 58.03 0.00
log(L), c(2) -0.03 0.01 -2.32 0.05
R-squared 0.40
Adjusted R-squared 0.33
Note: Detrended TFP is detrended by 1.83%, the average growth rate of TFP from 1921 to 1928.
         L is the sum of the deposits of suspended banks and the liabilities of business failures.
Sources: Kendrick (1961), Table A-XIX.
             NBER Macrohistory database, U.S. Number of Business Failures.
             Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1943), "Banking and Monetary Statistics 1914--1941."
             The number and liabilities of business failures in 1938 and 1939 are based on





log(detrended TFP)= c(1)+c(2) log(L)
Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.  
Constant, c(1) 5.20 0.13 39.02 0.00
log(L), c(2) -0.05 0.01 -4.68 0.00
R-squared 0.73
Adjusted R-squared 0.70
Note: L is the liabilities of business failures.
         Detrended TFP is detrended by 1.22%, the average growth rate of TFP from 1975 to 1987.
Sources: Hayashi and Prescott database, http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hayashi/Hayashi-Prescott1.htm.
              Tokyo Shoko Research, Annual Business Failure [in Japanese], 





log(detrended TFP) = C(1)+C(2)*(cost share of intermediate goods)
Coefficient Std. error t-statistic Prob.  
Constant 3.71 0.27 13.83 0.00
Cost share of intermediate goods 1.85 0.57 3.23 0.01
R-squared 0.518922
Adjusted R-squared 0.465469
Note: Detrended TFP is detrended by 1.22%, the average growth rate of TFP from 1975 to 1987.
Sources: Hayashi and Prescott database, http://www.e.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~hayashi/Hayashi-Prescott1.htm.
              Economic and Social Research Institute, Cabinet office, Government of Japan; "Annual Report on National Accounts of 2004."
              (Supporting Table 2. Gross Domestic Product and Factor Income Classified by Economic Activities [at current prices])